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Abstract
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1. Introduction
Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) have attracted
a significant amount of donor attention and resources in
recent years.1 According to the latest States of Fragility
report by theOECD (2018), donors spentUS$ 68 billion or
more than 65% of their earmarked funding in 58 fragile
contexts in 2016, and hence more than in other devel-
oping countries. Given that poverty will become increas-
ingly concentrated in fragile states in the next decade,
and that progress in these countries has been slowhistor-
ically, it is likely that aid flows in FCAS will continue their
steady increase.We also know that the amounts spent in
these fragile countries are not evenly spent, giving rise
to the phenomenon of aid darlings and aid orphans. A
few papers have used large-N analysis to examine aid
allocation and aid effectiveness in fragile countries. For
example, McGillivray (2006) and McGillivray and Feeny
(2008) examine aid allocation, and aid and growth, in
fragile states respectively. They find that fragile countries
face difficulties in absorbing the amounts of aid they re-
ceivewhen compared to other countries and that growth
would have been lower in the absence of aid. Carment,
Prest and Samy (2008) find that aid is allocated to frag-
ile states on the basis of their capacity and authority
structures but not according to legitimacy, which could
be problematic if countries remain trapped or face chal-
lenges in overcoming fragility as a result of lack of legiti-
macy. However, these empirical studies consider fragile
states as a group and do not fully exploit the different
ways in which countries are fragile. Indeed, few are the
studies that focus on the policy implications of fragility
persistence by considering specific country-cases. An
early study by Chauvet and Collier (2008) found that the
1 We use the term fragile states, fragile contexts, fragile countries and FCAS interchangeably in this article.
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average duration of a failing state is a prolonged period of
five decades because external financing for resource ex-
ports and aid tend to embolden and support rent seeking
elites and retard reforms. Andrimihaja and his colleagues
in their 2011 World Bank study cited a combination of
weak property rights enforcement, corruption, insecurity
and violence, which conspire to create a low growth equi-
librium (Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma, & Devarajan, 2011).
But what neither of these studies clarify is how these fac-
tors work together to generate fragility persistence.
To address this deficiency in theorising, in recent
years we have begun to see the emergence of a multi-
dimensional approach to the identification and classifica-
tion of fragile states (Carment, Prest, & Samy, 2009; Call,
2011; Gravingholt, Ziaja, & Kreibaum, 2015; OECD, 2015).
In this article, we draw from the Country Indicators for
Foreign Policy (CIFP) fragile states framework proposed
by Carment et al. (2009) to conduct our analysis. Accord-
ing to the CIFP framework, for a state to function prop-
erly it needs to exhibit three fundamental properties: au-
thority (A), legitimacy (L) and capacity (C). Fragility, again
according to the CIFP framework, refers to the extent
to which the actual characteristics of a state differ from
their ideal situation. Viewed in this way, all states are
to some extent fragile and weaknesses in one or more
of these three fundamental properties will have a neg-
ative impact on their fragility. The CIFP framework thus
includes an overall index of fragility and these three dif-
ferent characteristics of stateness, also known as the ALC
framework. Authority refers to the legislative power of
the state and its ability to control its territory, to pro-
vide core public goods, stability and security to its peo-
ple. Legitimacy refers to how much a particular govern-
ment commands loyalty to the governing regime and
how much domestic support it generates for its legis-
lation and policy. Capacity refers to the ability of the
state to mobilize and employ resources towards pro-
ductive ends.2 To obtain composite scores for author-
ity (A), legitimacy (L) and capacity (C), various indica-
tors are converted to a nine-point score based on the
performance of a country relative to a global sample of
countries. A higher score indicates that a country is per-
forming poorly relative to other countries. Whether a
state is strong or vulnerable is relative, and while certain
states are strong or resilient by certain measures, they
are weak by others. As recently pointed out by the Fund
for Peace, fragility affects even the world’s richest and
developed countries, as both the United States and the
United Kingdom are facing unprecedented internal po-
litical divisions, with the main difference, however, be-
ing that they have stronger capacity and resilience than
more fragile countries (see Messner, 2018).
This article extends recent work by Carment and
Samy (2017, in press) to consider aid targeting in fragile
states. Its core argument is that aid is poorly targeted in
fragile states; in particular, current aid allocations in the
chosen country-cases do not pay sufficient attention to
issues of authority and legitimacy that are both impor-
tant for understanding why countries are fragile. Since
Burnside and Dollar (2000), much attention has been de-
voted to the allocation of aid to countries with good poli-
cies. However, as pointed out by Hansen and Tarp (2000),
the Burnside-Dollar policy selectivity result is sensitive to
data and model specification, which makes the selectiv-
ity argument less robust. Furthermore, despite the evi-
dence of non-linearities in the aid-growth relationship,
it may well be the case that those countries that do not
have good policies in place are the ones that need aid
the most (Hansen & Tarp, 2000). We are well aware of
this dilemma in the case of fragile states, which by def-
inition are characterized by poor policy environments.
Our argument is not that aid should not be allocated to
countries that face authority and legitimacy challenges.
Instead, we argue that aid could be better targeted to
these weaknesses in order to improve its effectiveness.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the
next section, we present a typology of states using the
fragile states framework (Carment et al., 2009) discussed
above. Section 3 summarizes the evolution of fragility us-
ing both quantitative analysis and the examination of six
country-cases drawn from the typology discussed in Sec-
tion 2. Section 4 analyses how aid is spent in the six iden-
tified country-cases using the OECD Creditor Reporting
System (CRS) database. Section 5 concludes with the pol-
icy implications of our analysis.
2. A Typology of States
Just like Tolstoy’s unhappy family, each fragile state is
unique in its own way. However, we argue that we can
categorize countries according to three types of states
when one considers their performance over time: states
that are stuck in a fragility trap, states that move in and
out of fragility, and states that have exited fragility for a
significant period of time. To be sure, these states are not
identical in every aspect and neither are they fragile for
the same reasons. However, their trajectories have fol-
lowed particular patterns that allow them to be classified
under one of these three types. As fragility rankings such
as those fromFund for Peace and CIFP have shown, some
countries have remained among the worst performers
over time, with no sign of improvement. However, there
are otherswhowere once fragile and that have been able
to build resilience and are no longer classified among cur-
rent lists of fragile states. These are countries that we
characterize as having exited fragility. There is also an-
other category of in-between countries that havemoved
in and out of fragility, that is, where improvements in
their situations did not last very long.
In order to identify countries for each type (trapped,
in and out, and exited), we use the CIFP fragility index
discussed earlier. The advantage of this index when com-
2 In addition to information about authority, legitimacy and capacity, countries are also scored according to various clusters that include governance,
economics, security and crime, human development, demography, the environment, and gender as a cross-cutting theme.
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pared toothers is that it is available over a fewdecades go-
ing back to 1980.3 Given the persistence of fragility, this
allows us to observemovements over an extended period
of time that may be less visible with shorter time series
such as the Fragile States Index of the Fund for Peace that
is available since 2005 only. Countries that are trapped
in fragility are those that are ranked among the top 20
fragile countries for more than half of the period from
1980 to 2015, and whose long-term trajectory according
to fragility scores did not improve. This means that we
consider both the ranking and fragility scores in order to
avoid the possibility that the rank of countries could be
negatively affected if other countries are doing better,
even as the former are also improving. Trapped countries
include the likes of Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.
Countries that moved in and out of fragility are those
that were only able to exit the top 40 fragile countries for
a short period of time andwhose fragility scoreswere rel-
atively flat over the long-term. While the choice of the
top 40 might appear arbitrary, it is within the range of
contexts identified as fragile—the OECD (2018) currently
identifies 58 such situations—and if anything, imposed
a more constraining condition on those countries that
were deemed to have exited, albeit temporarily. In this
group, one can find countries such as Cameroon, Laos,
Mali, Rwanda and Senegal. Some of these countries are
currently classified as fragile (OECD, 2018) but our analy-
sis using CIFP’s data indicates that they have been in and
out of fragility. A third type of country consists of those
that have exited fragility. These are countries that were
among the most fragile countries in earlier years and ex-
ited the top 40 rankings for a period of ten years or more.
Countries in this category display improvement in their
fragility scores over the full period and include the likes
of Algeria, Bangladesh, Guatemala and Mozambique. Al-
though there is always a possibility that some of these
countries might go back into fragility, and that some of
them are still classified as fragile (OECD, 2018), the CIFP
data indicates that they have been able to exit the top
40 rankings.
Classifications and typologies are challenging. Other
than the more obvious cases that we consider trapped,
different indices tend to rank and thus categorize coun-
tries differently andwe are aware that our categorization
of states as being in and out of fragility, or exited, may be
disputed. However, for the purposes of this article, we
are interested in categorizing so that we can then trace
the evolution of these states over time using the ALC
framework, which we address in the next section, and
also to examine the allocation of aid to them.
3. Evolution of States Using the ALC Framework
3.1. Trapped, In and Out, and Exit
Why do countries end up being trapped, moving in and
out of fragility, or exiting fragility altogether? The existing
empirical literature on this issue remains fairly nascent.
In their UNU-WIDER Research Working Paper, Carment
and Samy (2017) find that there is strong evidence that
capability and legitimacy traps are significant correlates
of countries trapped in fragility, which when mapped
onto the ALC framework indicate that authority and legit-
imacy are significant.4 They also find evidence of a con-
flict trap (that is, authority challenges) as a contributing
factor and no evidence for the poverty trap when coun-
try fixed effects are taken into account. Overall, countries
are trapped for reasons that are more related to author-
ity and legitimacy, instead of capacity. Hence, their anal-
ysis, even if based on a small sample of ten countries us-
ing data collected for the period 1980–2015, and draw-
ing from the CIFP ALC framework, indicates that focusing
on capacity alone will not allow countries to escape the
fragility trap when there are insufficient improvements
to authority and legitimacy.
In an extension of this analysis to “in and out” states,
Carment and Samy (in press) find that the conflict trap
is important for that particular group. While the govern-
ments of countries in that category became more capa-
ble in some periods, their fragility scores only improved
temporarily as a result of failure to exercise control over
people and territories. On the other hand, the poverty
and legitimacy traps are not as significant for them. Link-
ing back to the ALC construct, authority seems to be the
most important driver that prevented them from build-
ing resilience and stability more permanently. Finally,
those countries that were able to exit fragility avoided
the recurrence of large scale conflict (overcoming the
conflict trap is significant in their case) but this was pos-
sible when they succeeded in building legitimacy as well.
So, overall, the evidence indicates that authority and le-
gitimacy are important drivers of fragility, with capacity
playing a smaller role.
3.2. Country-Cases5
Building on these observations from the various types of
fragile states identified above, we now turn our atten-
tion to six country-cases (two from each type) and how
they have evolved, or not, over time, once again linking
their evolution to the ALC framework. We should note
that the selected cases are exemplars or typical countries
3 Although the entire CIFP dataset is not made public, the methodology is fully transparent (see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, n.d.). Data for the
most recent year is publicly available each time the dataset is updated.
4 Capability traps (Pritchett & deWeijer, 2010, and Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2010) prevent fragile states from implementing basic functions such
as service provision, the maintainance of law and order, and security. These factors are more in line with how authority is defined in the CIFP frame-
work. In the case of legitimacy traps, they refer to countries that suffer from weak legitimacy due to high inequalities and authoritarian management
(Takeuchi, Murotani, & Tsunekawa, 2011).
5 For an extensive discussion of these cases, please see Carment and Samy (in press). Here we focus mostly on how fragility has evolved with respect to
the ALC framework across these different cases.
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found under each type (trapped, in and out, and exited).
We selected two under each category because we want
to show that while these countries can be classified as
belonging to specific types, they can be fragile for differ-
ent reasons. There is no reason, for example, to expect
Pakistan and Yemen to be fragile for similar reasons, and
yet both are classified as countries trapped in fragility. In
choosing our cases, we also wanted to make sure that
they were in different regions of the world, as opposed
to all, if not most, coming from the same region.
Let us therefore first consider Pakistan and Yemen as
our two trapped states. Both are middle-income coun-
tries and are thus not among the poorest fragile coun-
tries. Their trajectories are different, with Yemen a col-
lapsed state in the midst of a horrific civil war and
Pakistan still deeply fragile but improving economically.
Since unification in 1990, Yemen’s fragility ranking has
deteriorated, compared to fluctuating but moderate lev-
els of fragility in the 1980s. Although there was a brief
period of stability from 1995 to 1998, Yemen has been
among the top 10 most fragile countries since 2001 ac-
cording to CIFP’s fragility index; following the outbreak
of civil war and Saudi intervention in 2015, it was ranked
4th. 85,000 children under five are estimated to have
died from extreme hunger or disease since the beginning
of the civil war according to a recent report by Save the
Children (2018). Authority, which has been very volatile
as a result of conflict and terrorist events, and legitimacy,
resulting from lack of support for Saleh’s regime lead-
ing to his removal and the takeover of the government
by the Houthis in 2015, have been the most important
drivers of fragility in the case of Yemen.
Pakistan’s average fragility rank was around 15 ac-
cording to CIFP’s fragility index, and it has remained in
the top 20 most fragile states for most years over the
1980 to 2015 period. Both its authority and legitimacy
scores have deteriorated in the last 20 years while capac-
ity has remained stable. The country’s inability to control
internal conflict and the highly unequal nature of its so-
ciety has meant that civilian and military governments
have not been able to build legitimacy while develop-
mental aid has reinforced a centralized authority struc-
ture, regardless of its legitimacy.
The fragility trap for Pakistan and Yemen are both
related to problems of legitimacy that further under-
mine their authority structures, thus allowing for a neg-
ative interaction between legitimacy and authority. In
general terms, strengthening authority structures with-
out appropriate resource distribution goes hand in hand
with declining legitimacy. Capacity is skewed tomaintain-
ing control over the distribution of resources and rents
in favour of entrenched and unelected elites. Fissures
based on ethnic cleavages, elite capture and rent seek-
ing behaviour are met with coercive measures to main-
tain stability but come at the costs of further declines
in legitimacy.
In examining the importance of a legitimacy feed-
back loop for Yemen, we see that deposed head of state
Saleh’s leadership ideology had essentially been one of
regime survival, as the system of governance under his
rule was a savvy mixture of Islamic, conservative, and
liberal economic policies (Carment & Samy, 2017). Fur-
thermore, his legitimacy stemmed primarily from his
regime’s ability to maintain stability and to provide re-
wards to his clients. Much of that stability stemmed from
the aid Yemen received in support of its contribution to
the Global War on Terror (Carment & Samy, in press).
Thus Yemen’s fragility trap is a function of mutually rein-
forcing structural constraints. Saleh carefully constructed
a patronage system that provided benefits to a select
few clients (Clark, 2010). But that narrow support base
also constrained his ability to improve the country’s econ-
omy, for example through structural adjustment, and im-
proved social services. As long as resources were avail-
able, such as rents from oil revenues, development as-
sistance and military aid, the regime was secure and did
not need to reform though the country itself remained
deeply fragile. When those narrowly distributed benefits
began to diminish, and as oil output declined, so too did
Saleh’s hold on power. Ultimately, his concentration of
personal power and the neglect of the periphery left the
field open to new challengers, such as disaffected south-
erners, Islamist groups, and the northern Houthi move-
ment. Yemen’s legitimacy feedback loop was lethal be-
cause Saleh’s regime survival was tied to a declining rent
economy leading to reduced capacity and control over
territory and ultimately collapse.
Like Yemen, Pakistan’s fragility challenges appear to
be linked to problems of legitimacy which further un-
dermine its authority structures. But here the legtimacy
feedback loop is pernicious and so far non-lethal. Sys-
temic social fissures, which pit ethnic and sectarian
groups against each other, form the unsteady founda-
tion upon which Pakistan’s political institutions are built
(Carment & Samy, in press). Inequality between ethnic
groups, in particular, has highlighted poor legitimacy as
various calls for self-government by provincial regions
seeking autonomous control over their resources clearly
demonstrate a loss of confidence in the capacity of Pak-
istan’s regimes to act in their interests. In addition, con-
tinued elite capture of power and resources has con-
tributed to a depreciation in the quality of Pakistan’s insti-
tutions. The result is a governance system that explicitly
favours networks of unelected ruling elites, and a public
with little trust for ruling regimes.
The negative reinforcement of Pakistan’s authority
structures is achieved through an institutional system,
political structure and popular media in Pakistan that
collectively reinforces the identity of state-centric na-
tionalism. The Pakistani state is not so much a subordi-
nate to dominant ethnic groups but works in partner-
ship with them. This partnership is reinforced when the
state is challenged by regionalminority groups, itself a re-
sponse generated by assimilative pressures, policies on
in-migration, economic competition and more recently
political threats of secession. Simply put, Pakistan’s
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fragility begins with a weakness in legitimacy structures
which rather than being adaptively modified in a positive
way are negatively reinforced, with the consequence of
increasing instability over the short run.
The feedback loop is pernicious because when Pak-
istan experiences internal legitimacy challenges there is
an effort to reinforce oppressive authority structures, no
matter how weak they are as a bulwark against further
decline. Such an emphasis, exemplified in the United
States’ long-term aid program for Pakistan (as a result of
its support for allies in the Global War on Terror), led to
a potential distortion in both the selection of aid recipi-
ents, and the type of aid provided. A large amount of aid,
including billions of dollars inmilitary aid from theUnited
States, has been given to Pakistan, regardless of the le-
gitimacy of the regime in power. The results are deeply
unpopular, and contribute to the persistence of nearly il-
legitimate regimes dependent on external aid, and that
are unstable over the long term.
For the in and out cases, let us consider Mali and
Laos. In the case of Mali, CIFP’s data indicates that Mali
has been in and out of the top 40 fragile states at least
four times, with a deteriorating trend in the last few
years after the Tuareg rebellion andmilitary coup in 2012.
The main source of Mali’s fragility has to do with chal-
lenges to authority, partly as a result of lack of control
over its territory and people. Conversely, recovery from
fragility occurs when challenges to authority are termi-
nated, even if only temporarily. Capacity problems result-
ing from a weak aid-dependent economy have kept the
country close to the cut-off for exiting fragility and very
vulnerable to shocks.
Mali’s spectacular collapse in recent years has
sparked a re-examination of its characterization as a
model of stability in North Africa. In reality, Mali has
never been such amodel (Carment & Samy, in press) and
its recent conflict is the rule rather than the exception.
The picture of Mali is of a country that continually exits
fragility, only to re-enter it further down the road. This
underperformance is concomitant with an increase in in-
ternational development assistance. Mali has generally
been an aid-dependent country, but aid increased sub-
stantially in real terms since its attempts to transition
to a hybrid form of democracy in the 1990s. The effects
of increasing aid, driven in part by promises to reform
economically and politically, have been staggeringly neg-
ative. That is becauseMali’s elite benefit from aid by ‘bro-
kering’ its distribution. In order to operate effectively, in-
ternationally funded NGOs rely on the cooperation (or
at least benign neglect) of local government institutions
(Carment & Samy, in press). In Mali, this has resulted in
political alliances between influential politicians cum aid
brokers and key NGOs. Far from representing the inter-
ests of the people by establishing and adhering to insti-
tutional performance measures under a democratic sys-
tem, the goal is to establish a patronage network and
push for additional zones around areas over which they
have more control.
More generally,Mali’s aid economy offers a viable op-
tion to the thin veneer of democratic reform on display
to the donor community. For example, partnering with a
developmentNGOallows local politicians an opportunity
to skim funds, either directly, or indirectly by influencing
where the money is spent. Additionally, NGOs need to
engage the population. In a country where the majority
are illiterate, well-educated elites are hired. These elite
constitute the bridge between regions and the state but
operate from within the state apparatus and therefore
are uncritical of it, and the legitimacy that underpins it
(Carment & Samy, in press). It becomes self-evident why
democratic institutions have little purpose under such
an arrangement, other than providing the cloak of in-
ternational legitimacy through which state and regional
elites can ensure resource distribution for the people of
Mali. However, such a system has the potential to under-
resource key sectors of society which do not factor into
the maintenance of this economic system, such as the
military (Carment & Samy, in press).
Unlike Mali, Laos (Laos People’s Democratic
Republic—Laos PDR) has never really been considered a
model of stability. It is a country of only 6.2million people,
surrounded by larger, more powerful neighbours. Though
both it and Mali have been afflicted by environmental
calamity such as droughts, Laos has shown that it can
recover in the face of adversity. The communist takeover
in 1975 provided regime stability by bringing an end to
years of civil war, but since then, Laos’s leaders have
been unable to bring meaningful reform and economic
growth to their people. Until recently, the country’s pri-
mary weaknesses were authority followed by capacity;
when either deteriorate, the country moves back into
fragility. Laos has been in and out of fragility five times
over the last 30 years. The entries by Laos into the top 40
are consistent with the historical analysis coinciding with
severe drought and border wars, conflict with Hmong in-
surgents, severe flooding and the Asian Financial Crisis of
1997. Laos’ subsequent improvement from about 2009
onward is a result of the regime’s slow but positive re-
forms to address security and economic stabilisation.
Economic growth has proved a double edge sword
for Laos.With a number of trading partners to work with,
Laotian elites have proved adept at insinuating their own
economic interests into trade and investment frame-
works that Laos has with established regional power-
houses. Though there are immense dependencies within
these relationships, it has also meant that Laos has bene-
fitted fromamuch greater political latitude that imposed
structural adjustment programmes and aid programmes
normally generate. In essence, Laos’ improvement over
the last 10 years can be understood from the perspec-
tive of spillover of economic success from its larger neigh-
bourswithout the democratic baggage. But the country’s
weakness also emanates from the same source. There
are relatively few reform-minded elites who are able
to shrug off the mantle of risk averse communist style
Politburo decision-making.
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The result of such a political economy is one which
is entirely dependent on the ruling regime for rent re-
distribution. Indeed, the few sectors which have experi-
enced liberalization have been those primarily devoted
to resource extraction/export, which are dominated by
party or military officials. Thus, if there is a weakness
in Laos’s trajectory it is simply that its leaders are slow
to make policy decisions that could improve the lives of
average citizens. These outputs in turn should create ex-
pectations, raise accountability and open up the political
system. Instead, the regime concentrates on liberalizing
and expanding only those sectors which it fully controls
for fear they could lose power, influence and income.
In comparing Laos with Mali, we see there are two
different paths. One (Mali) is the possibility of regression
and succumbing eventually to lethal feedback loops, the
other (Laos) is a potentially stable exit. The likelihood of
a stable exit assumes that reformists within government
eventually succeed in expanding resource distribution.
Conversely, a lethal feedback loop awaits those countries
with poor economic performance, coupled with an econ-
omy based on aid dependence. Under such conditions,
as we have seen with the trapped states, a focus on se-
curity issues at the expense of stronger state-society re-
lations undermines further economic growth.
We turn now to Bangladesh and Mozambique both
of which have built resilience and exited fragility. In the
case of Bangladesh, as one of the most fragile coun-
tries in the world in 1980, it left the top 40 ranking in
1991 and has only gone back into that category twice
(in 2004–2005 and 2007–2008). According to CIFP’s data,
this transformation is the result of improvements in au-
thority and legitimacy, and also a gradual improvement
in capacity. A key contributing factor was the replace-
ment of military control in domestic crisis management
through opportunities for political mobilization and re-
form. With the help of international donors, political re-
form was followed by improved economic performance
and improvements in authority. Even moderate commit-
ments to reform have made a big difference. Bangladesh
realized a respectable level of civilianization of its mili-
tary leaders and a nascent, if not dysfunctional, multi-
party political organization (Carment & Samy, in press).
The leaders of Mozambique’s Frelimo showed flexibility
and pragmatism in the aftermath of protracted war. In-
stead of focusing on revenge, they focused on economic
growth. For Bangladesh, the country’s strong improve-
ment in capacity fuelled by rapid economic growth was
reinforced by powerful deep-rooted patron-client rela-
tions, resilience in the face of adversity, and a strong
civil society presence. Mozambique in contrast, though
its economic growth is strong, is run by a rent seeking po-
litical party that appears unwilling to relinquish control.
Just as Pakistan and Yemen remain trapped because
of legitimacy issues that further undermine authority
structures, Bangladesh was able to create space for civil
society and new political parties. The resulting legitimacy
enabled export-led manufacturing to drive the economy,
and allowed the country to exit from being a fragile state.
Mozambique, for its part, was able to exit fragility at the
end of the civil war in 1992. The largest improvements
towards the end of the civil war and thereafter were
recorded in legitimacy, followed by authority. And as in
the case of Bangladesh, export driven economic growth
helped Mozambique to exit. Both countries exited from
fragility through two stages. First by overcoming the ad-
versities of war as well as meeting the challenges of nat-
ural and man-made disasters (flooding in the case of
Bangladesh, demining in the case of Mozambique) and
second by focusing on economic growth through signifi-
cant reforms implementedwith support from the interna-
tional community. During the first phase, we see decreas-
ing volatility in both legitimacy and authority and only
later in the secondphase improvements in capacity based
on economic growth and more diversified economies.
These transitions have been far from perfect. Both
aid and extractive industry rents have aggravated
Mozambique’s fragility by undermining regime legiti-
macy and effectiveness due to poor resource distribu-
tion. Maputo’s growth is not matched by equivalent
gains in the hinterland. The absence of accountability is
key here. For example, Perez Nino and Le Billon (2013)
argue that Mozambique will ultimately fall back into
fragility because of its low tax burden on elites which in
turn puts minimal pressure on these elites to provide so-
cial spending for all Mozambicans.
Politically, as hybrid democracies both countries have
substantial difficulties in managing political transitions
without violence and political unrest. Mozambique in-
troduced multi-party elections in 1989 though Frelimo
has ruled ever since. Bangladesh is a multi-party democ-
racy but one consistently undermined by cronyism, cor-
ruption and dynasticism. To be fair, much of Bangladesh
and Mozambique’s corruption might be reinvested in
their respective economies creating a kind of virtuous
feedback loop. But other virtuous feedback loops are
present, including investments in human capital projects,
to some degree gender empowerment (in the case
of Bangladesh) and spontaneous forms of privatization.
These all serve to indirectly improve legitimacy and au-
thority by reducing social unrest and improving legiti-
macy outputs.
These two cases show that it is possible for countries
to exit fragility with the right mix of political and eco-
nomic reforms in the presence of independent political
institutions and support from the international commu-
nity. Whether both cases remain out of fragility will de-
pend not simply on continued economic growth and ca-
pacity improvements, but on whether state-society rela-
tions remain strong. Mozambique’s future is less clear-
cut than Bangladesh’s. If there is a major constraint for
Mozambique, it is its inability to match poverty reduc-
tion with rapid economic growth especially as new sec-
tors such as mining show lower levels of productivity.
Like Bangladesh, Mozambique’s political and eco-
nomic interdependencies were most evident in its for-
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mative years after the war. Where catalysing negative
effects had the potential to shift the country down-
ward, political leadership moved the country in a more
positive direction with the support of the international
community. When stressed, as in a time of political up-
heaval, Mozambique’s leaders revealed a modest ability
to recuperate.
To summarize, the statistical analysis by Carment and
Samy (2017) showed that capability, legitimacy and con-
flict (to a certain degree) are key correlates of the fragility
trap. The capability and conflict traps are equivalent to
authority according to CIFP’s framework, and the legiti-
macy trap with CIFP’s legitimacy cluster. While conflict is
a factor that was present in all of the above cases at one
point or another in their recent history, it was not a lead-
ing reason for how fragile they are or have been. Yemen is
the only case where conflict has arguably kept it trapped.
The dominance of themilitary in the case of Pakistan has
prevented it from succumbing to a lethal feedback loop
but the result is deteriorating state legitimacy and lim-
ited political freedoms. In the case of Bangladesh and
Mozambique, both recovered from large scale civil con-
flicts as a result of political and economic processes that
were both legitimate and sustainable. For the two in and
out countries, Mali and Laos, low intensity conflicts have
made it more difficult to assert authority and build le-
gitimacy, especially for Mali, though less so in the case
of Laos.
The inherent difficulty of a fragile state attempting
to exit the trap is straightforward. Leaders of deeply frag-
ile states are able to survive with a small but powerful
support base by tying private welfare to their own wel-
fare (Carment & Samy, in press). Even though the state is
the primary instrument of power and may even indeed
possess overwhelming coercive capacity, its leaders lack
the autonomy to affect concessions for reform. Since
a necessary ingredient for implementing reform is pub-
lic support for such policies, elites that are unaccount-
able to the larger population (in which the possibility of
overturning the government is always present) have lit-
tle incentive to pursue change. Legitimacy is weakened
even further when elites are forced to expend greater re-
sources on coercive means in order to ensure they are
obeyed. Under these conditions, elites express only a
minimal commitment to reform. This is because the cen-
tralization of state authority and the pursuit of develop-
ment policies aimed at maximizing revenues and rents,
rather than social welfare, produce a process which has
non-elected institutions and elites dominating.
States remain trapped or fall back into fragility when
they fail to provide public goods that benefit large parts
of the population, even in the face of improved capac-
ity. Situations where there is a decline in the provision
of public goods is often followed by decreasing volun-
tary compliance, such as tax payment, which can in turn
reduce government effectiveness further. Given the im-
portance of legitimacy and authority for the evolution of
states, and the lack of evidence supporting the poverty
trap, in the next section we examine how aid is allocated
to these various countries.
4. Sectoral Aid Allocations and the CIFP Framework
In this section, we use gross official development assis-
tance (or foreign aid) disbursements from all Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) donors to compare
aid allocation across the six country-cases discussed ear-
lier.6 Of the six countries, Mozambique is currently the
most aid dependent country with an aid to gross na-
tional income ratio of 14% in 2016, followed by Mali
(9%) and Yemen (7%) according to data from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset. On the
other hand, the numbers for Bangladesh and Pakistan
are around 1%, and 2–3% in the case of Laos. However,
even in the case of Bangladesh and Laos, aid represents
a fairly significant percentage of central government ex-
penditure (which arguably is a better measure since it
shows the extent to which states rely on foreign aid for
their budgets) at 12% and 18% respectively, while in the
case of Mali it is an incredible 70%, for 2016. Therefore,
the countries that we examine are quite dependent on
foreign aid. We calculate the average sectoral aid alloca-
tion using the CRS aid activity of the OECD for the period
2003–2016 during which detailed sectoral level data is
available for our six country-cases.
Of most relevance to us is aid allocated to social
infrastructure and services which comprises anywhere
from41 to 51%of aid allocated (see column (a) of Table 1)
and is by far the most important sector.7 This sector is
relevant because it includes aid allocated towards educa-
tion, health, population policies and programmes, water
supply and sanitation, government and civil society, and
other social infrastructure. Except for government and
civil society, all the other categories are mostly related
to capacity in the ALC framework. As can be seen in col-
umn (b) of Table 1, they comprise a significant proportion
of column (a); for example, in the case of Pakistan, they
account for 75%of aid allocated towards social infrastruc-
ture and services, while government and civil society ac-
counts for the remaining 25%. This is in fact a pattern that
repeats itself across all the six country-cases, with most
aid going towards capacity-related issues.
The difference between columns (a) and (b) is aid al-
located to government and civil society (column (c)). The
latter can be further broken down as government and
civil society—general (column (d)) and conflict, peace
and security (column (e)). Government and civil society—
general, includes funding for democratic participation
6 Our analysis excludes military aid because we focus on official development assistance. However, we are aware that this is significant for countries
such as Pakistan. For example, for several years after the 9/11 attacks, United States security assistance to Pakistan exceeded economic assistance (see
Center for Global Development, n.d.).
7 Other sectors include economic infrastructure, production sectors, multi-sector/cross-cutting, commodity aid, action related to debt, humanitarian
assistance, administrative costs of donors, refugees in donor countries and unallocated/unspecified.
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Table 1. Aid allocation to social infrastructure and services as a % of total aid, 2003–2016. Source: OECD DAC CRS
(OECD, n.d.).
Country Total Education, Health, Population, WaterSupply, Other Social Infrastructure
Government and Civil Society
Total General Conflict, Peace and Security
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Pakistan 41.1 30.6 10.5 9.4 1.1
Yemen 51.1 41.4 9.7 8.4 1.3
Mali 47.4 36.4 11.0 9.3 1.7
Laos 43.6 31.6 12.0 7.4 4.6
Bangladesh 41.3 33.4 7.9 7.7 0.1
Mozambique 50.9 42.2 8.7 8.0 0.7
and civil society, elections and human rights.8 These are
related to legitimacy under the ALC framework and rep-
resent between 7.4% to 9.4% on average (column (d)).
Aid allocated towards conflict, peace and security (col-
umn (e))—which under the ALC framework fits under
authority—is even smaller, accounting for less than 2%
for most of the country-cases. Part of the explanation for
why most aid goes to capacity and less to authority and
legitimacy may have to do with the short time horizon of
donors that are often in search of quick wins. Indeed, it is
easier to see results when one builds a school or invests
in healthcare but, for example, political stability (build-
ing authority) and improving the quality of democracy
(building legitimacy) are more difficult to achieve even if
long-term impacts may be far more important in helping
states become resilient.
Two trends are clear from the above analysis. First, a
very high proportion of aid is allocated towards capacity
but less so towards legitimacy and authority. We are not
arguing that capacity is not important. Issues such as edu-
cation and health, which have been prioritized by donors,
and especially after the adoption of the Millennium De-
velopment Goals, attracted a lot of funding in the years
that followed. On the other hand, to the extent that au-
thority and legitimacy matter for the evolution of states,
particularly those that are trapped or are falling back into
the trap, they are, comparatively, areas that have not re-
ceived the same level of attention. We should note that
even if we report averages in Table 1, examining varia-
tion over time does not change our overall conclusions.
Furthermore, in countries such as Pakistan, if we think
beyond development aid to consider other forms of as-
sistance, large amounts of aid from the United States, in-
cluding significant military assistance, have undermined
rather than promote democracy (Ali, 2009).
While the low percentages allocated towards “con-
flict, peace and security” make sense in the case of
Bangladesh and Mozambique, our two exit states, the
same cannot be said about Mali or Yemen. We should
note that the results reported here differ from those in
Carment et al. (2008), in part because the current article
focuses on a narrow set of countries, whereas the former
examines aid allocation for all countries that include both
fragile and non-fragile countries. However, they still con-
firm that legitimacy is not a factor that seems to be taken
into account by donors. Second, the sectoral allocation of
aid towards legitimacy (see column (d)) does not seem to
vary much across the six country-cases, even if the situ-
ation of these countries with respect to fragility and its
evolution is quite different.
5. Conclusions
While issues of aid allocation and aid effectiveness have
received a lot of attention in the academic and policy lit-
erature, comparatively less has beenwritten about these
issues with respect to fragile states. Of the few papers
that have done so and discussed at the beginning of this
article, none have, as far as we are aware, combined
the findings of quantitative analysis with specific country-
cases to examine whether aid is targeted towards the
characteristics that explain the evolution of states. This
is what we set out to do in this article. By comparing the
sectoral allocation of aid with the CIFP framework, we
have shown that aid allocation does not pay sufficient
attention to issues of legitimacy and authority that are
both important for understandingwhy countries are frag-
ile. While measuring aid effectiveness (i.e. the impact of
aid) is beyond the scope of the current article, we think
that a first step is making sure that aid is targeted where
it is needed. And for this, it is paramount that donors pay
more attention to the multiple ways in which countries
are fragile, and the conditions that prevent them from
exiting fragility permanently such as lethal and pernicous
feedback loops, rent seeking and failure to buy reform.
In this context, for those states where fragility is per-
sistent we find that elites who are resistant to change
engage in damaging and self-interested behaviour such
as corruption and rent seeking. With a focus on symp-
toms rather than causes, policies are rarely successful
8 This includes funding towards public management and domestic revenue mobilization, which can help countries build authority through taxation. As
pointed out by Tilly (1975) and Herbst (2000), taxation is fundamental for statebuilding and creates a fiscal pact between citizens and the state. Un-
fortunately, as noted by Culpeper and Bhushan (2010), for example, a very small fraction of technical assistance is devoted to public sector financial
management in sub-Saharan Africa.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 93–102 100
because they do not get to the core of the fragility trap
problem. International and domestic incentives for lead-
ers of trapped states to embrace reforms that affect their
personal interests are often too weak. Indeed, policies
intended to induce reform are not only misplaced, they
are often counterproductive (Chauvet & Collier, 2008). In
addition to the dilemma that selectivity poses for fragile
states (see introduction), there is an extensive literature
on conditionality associated with aid programs reinforc-
ing our point that aid conditionality fails more often than
not (see, for example, Collier, 1997, and Dijkstra, 2002).
That is because they rely on causal explanations focus-
ing on one structural factor such as economic develop-
ment or political development, which by themselves are
insufficient. In many of these interpretations, fragility is
usually associatedwith poor policy environments, aid ab-
sorption problems, conflict and poverty.
We find that policies focused purely on structure will
be misplaced if there is limited willingness for leaders of
trapped states to reform. We emphasize the importance
of state-society relations, specifically the role of legiti-
macy in underpinning the behaviour of political, social
and economic elites, in the formation of undergoverned
spaces and a coercive state apparatus, rent seeking be-
haviour, and in building a less resilient society overall.
These assumptions are premised on claims regarding in-
teractions between the superordinate elements of state
authority, capacity, and legitimacy and not just economic
development and democracy. For a state that has exited
fragility, positive changes in authority that address soci-
etal well-being not only provide valuable guidance for
government policy, they also reduce literal barriers to
commerce and economic development (measures of ca-
pacity) such as restrictions on citizen movement and as-
sembly (measures of legitimacy). Responsiveness also in-
duces governments to produce policies addressing popu-
lar concerns that are not growth-focused, such as wealth
distribution and social programming, andwhich by exten-
sion increase state legitimacy.
Our overall conclusion is that trapped states aremost
prone to lethal and pernicious feedback loops. In general
terms, strengthening authority structureswithout appro-
priate resource distribution goes hand in hand with de-
clining legitimacy. Capacity is skewed tomaintaining con-
trol over the distribution of resources and rents in favour
of entrenched and often, unelected elites. Fissures based
on ethnic cleavages, elite capture and rent seeking be-
haviour are met with coercive measures to maintain sta-
bility but come at the costs of further declines in legiti-
macy. Lethal feedback loops occur when regime survival
is tied to a declining rent economy leading to reduced ca-
pacity and control over territory and ultimately collapse.
Undergoverned spaces increase over time, as patron-
client politics and resources weaken simultaneously. Un-
der these conditions, elites express only a minimal com-
mitment to reform. This is because the centralization of
state authority and the pursuit of development policies
aimed at maximizing revenues and rents, rather than so-
cial welfare, produce a process which has non-elected in-
stitutions and elites dominating. There is only a limited
opportunity for elites to pursue reforms.
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